University of Cincinnati College of Law

University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

2014

Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and
Conflict: Symposium Introduction
Sandra F. Sperino
University of Cincinnati College of Law, sandra.sperino@uc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Disability
Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Supreme Court of
the United States Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Sperino, Sandra F., "Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and Conflict: Symposium Introduction" (2014). Faculty Articles and Other
Publications. Paper 294.
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/294

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship
and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of
Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.

Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and
Conflict: Symposium Introduction
MARTHA CHAMALLAS* & SANDRA

F. SPERINOt

Curiously, the connection between civil rights and civil wrongs has not
been a topic that has captivated the attention of large numbers of legal scholars
over the years. The distance that has developed between the two fields likely
reflects their placement on opposite sides of the public-private divide, with
Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes forming part of public law,
while torts is a classic, private law subject. To compound the division, both
subjects are to some extent still under-theorized. Employment discrimination
scholarship is often caught up in the process of analyzing the doctrinal
implications of the latest Supreme Court cases, with less attention paid to big
picture questions. For its part, torts scholarship still has relatively little to say
about social equality or harms related to discrimination, despite the recent
growth in tort theory.1
This Symposium is a product of our conviction that the time is ripe for
serious consideration of the intersection of these two fields, owing principally
to recent developments in the U.S. Supreme Court. In 2011, the Court
expressed its view that when Congress created "a federal tort" through
enacting Title VII, it "adopt[ed] the background of general tort law." 2 Three
years later, the Court reiterated that it regards Title VII as a statutory tort. In a
5-4 opinion adopting the "but-for" causation test for use in retaliation cases,
the majority declared that tort rules should be treated as "the default rules [that
Congress] is presumed to have incorporated, absent an indication to the
contrary . . . ."3
The Court has not always been so intrigued by tort law. Up until the late
1980s, the Court hardly mentioned tort law in Title VII cases, instead relying
on the purposes underlying Title VII and the language of the Act to guide its
interpretations. 4 From the late 1980s to 2009, it employed a more balanced
approach, sometimes using tort as a supplementary tool to help it decide cases
in particular contexts, but being careful to adapt tort principles to the purposes
and needs of anti-discrimination statutes.5 However, since Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc. was decided in 2009, rejecting mixed-motivation
analysis and adopting the "but-for" causation test for ADEA cases, 6 and
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See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:

RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 30-34 (2010) (discussing "critical torts scholarship"

focused on gender and race).
2 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1187 (2011).
3Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).
4
See Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REv. 1052, 1057 (2014).
5See id at 1058-63.
6Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
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particularly since Staub v. Proctor Hospital incorporated the controversial
concept of proximate cause into anti-discrimination law in 2011,7 the Court
has stepped up its project of "taking up" tort law to resolve employment
discrimination disputes. Clearly something new is afoot that has taken many
academics in both fields by surprise.
As the contributions to this Symposium attest, the Court's rapid moves
have begun to inspire a rethinking of the "basics" in both fields, forcing us to
tease out the similarities and dissimilarities in these two regimes ostensibly
dedicated to righting wrongs and deterring harms. Several scholars
participating in this Symposium deserve credit for initiating the dialogue
through their publication of articles examining the Court's borrowing of tort
principles for use in Title VII and ADEA cases,8 most notably in 5-4 decisions
in favor of employers. Meanwhile, the American Law Institute-the
organization responsible for creating the Restatements of Law, including the
highly influential Restatement of Torts-has been quick to point out the record
number of times the Restatement had been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the past year. 9 There can be little doubt that this Supreme Court has
rediscovered "the common law" and is using it to reshape anti-discrimination
law. Even the EEOC has gotten into the act. It refers to tort principles in its
new guidance on disparate impact under the ADEA, although the agency gives
the importation of tort principles a more plaintiff-friendly twist.10
This move to incorporate common law principles into statutory antidiscrimination claims has already proven controversial, with several Title VII
scholars being openly skeptical or critical of this development." We have not
heard as much yet from tort scholars, in part because the migration has largely
been a one-way street-moving tort principles into civil rights law rather than
infusing tort law with civil rights norms and principles. However, we should
not lose sight of the fact that the migration occasionally shifts direction when,
for example, common law courts take a page from Title VII harassment law to

7
Staub,
8

131 S. Ct. at 1193.
See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A
Proposalto Let Employment DiscriminationSpeak for Itself 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 455
(2013); Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate
Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 34; Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment
Discrimination,92 B.U. L. REv. 1431, 1467 (2012).
92014 Supreme Court Citations, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/news/2014-sccitations.html, (last visited Sep. 5, 2014), archivedat http://perma.cc/7B79-8A7K.
1029 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e)(1) (2012) ("A reasonable factor other than age is a non-age

factor that is objectively reasonable when viewed from the position of a prudent employer
mindful of its responsibilities under the ADEA under like circumstances.").
1 See William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the "Tortification" of
Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1027, 1030 (2014) (noting that
"scholarly commentary on the subject since Staub has ranged from cautious to suspicious
to highly critical").
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inform the tort concept of "outrageous" conduct' 2 or use anti-discrimination
principles to prohibit the use of gender-based or race-based economic data in
computing loss of future earning capacity in garden-variety tort actions. 13
Additionally, although we have recently come to associate the incorporation of
tort principles with pro-business, pro-defendant outcomes, the contributions in
this Symposium demonstrate that such a simple equation is not inevitable as a
matter of theory or doctrine, given that tort law has the potential to expand
remedies for discrimination victims as well.
The unique aspect of this Symposium is that it brings together civil rights
and torts scholars for the first time to analyze the intersection of their fields.
Some of us have used this opportunity to step back and reflect, while others
have sharpened and deepened our critiques. Because of its cross-field nature,
the Symposium has taken many of us into uncharted waters, generating a mix
of theory and doctrine, blending references to discrimination based on race,
sex, age, disability, and genetics and taking differing approaches to tort law. It
focuses simultaneously on big questions about the compatibility of public and
private law and the limits of the judicial interpretive process as well as on
smaller, practical questions related to the integration of specific civil rights and
tort doctrines and principles.
Although the articles in this Symposium are far too diverse and wideranging to summarize in a paragraph, there are some recurring themes that
break through the surface and deserve particular attention. There seems to be
wide agreement that incorporating tort principles into anti-discrimination law
is (or at least should be) a complex process, going well beyond labeling Title
VII a statutory tort. 14 At a minimum, if done well, the tortification process
requires identifying the precise elements of tort law to be taken up, critically
examining the content of those strands of tort law, and being aware of the high
degree of selectivity in the process, whereby only some strands of tort law are
chosen for incorporation while other possible features of the common law are
not so selected. 15 Indeed, the selectivity of the incorporation process has
prompted several contributors to speculate about the effect on Title VII (and
other anti-discrimination laws) if different tort doctrines were incorporated or
different tort analogies were drawn,16 demonstrating the indeterminacy of both
12

See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2115, 2176 (2007).
13 See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific
Economic Data in Tort Litigation:A ConstitutionalArgument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 75
(1994).
14

See Corbett, supra note 11, at 1030; Sandra F. Sperino, Let's Pretend

DiscriminationIs a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1105-07 (2014).
1
5 See Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort
and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1311, 1311-14 (2014); Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a
Madness to the Method? Torts and Other Influences on Employment DiscriminationLaw,

75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1087-88 (2014).
16 See Deborah L. Brake, Tortifying Retaliation:ProtectedActivity at the Intersection
ofFault,Duty and Proximate Cause, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1371, 1371-74 (2014); Catherine E.
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bodies of law. This Symposium has also sharpened the debate over the
potential costs of privileging private law principles and modes of reasoning
over more "purposive" interpretive approaches that emphasize the distinctive
civil rights or public policy objectives of anti-discrimination laws.17 In
particular, several contributions in this Symposium note that tortification has
mainly served to solidify the regime of at-will employment, placing
management prerogatives ahead of the equality interests of employees.' 8 In
favor of torts and common law, however, many contributors see torts as a
valuable resource for certain discrimination victims who find the remedies
under the status-bound statutory schemes inadequate.19
Four contributions in the Symposium present broad overviews and
reflections on the tort incorporation process. The opening selection, What Is
Troubling About the Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law? by
William R. Corbett, provides a comprehensive retrospective on the
incorporation controversy, examining the various ways in which an
employment discrimination claim is or is not "tortlike." 20 Calling the
tortification process "potentially pernicious" and responsible for producing an
"asymmetrical and chaotic" body of employment discrimination law, Corbett
nevertheless holds out hope for reform through more careful analysis and
adaptation of tort law to the employment discrimination context. 2 1 Charles A.
Sullivan's contribution, Is There a Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, meditates on the judicial
interpretive process and offers the core insight that courts "can draw on only a
limited number of concepts," making resort to basic tort principles
understandable and unexceptional. 22 Taking the vitrying judicial constructions
of the term "employee" as his example, however, Sullivan asks the probing
question why the Court sometimes reaches for "more technical, common law
meaning[s,]" rather than interpreting the law in line with an "ordinary,
contemporary, [or] common meaning" derived from real-world experiences
and social practices. 23 In a penetrating thought experiment, Sandra F.
Smith, Looking to Torts: Exploring the Risks of Workplace Discrimination,75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1205, 1205-06 (2014); Sperino, supra note 14, at 1121-25.
17
See Maria L. Ontiveros, Title VII as FundamentalLaw, 75 OHIO ST. L J. 1163,
1171-72(2014).
18
See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1142-55(2014); Corbett, supra note 11, at
1039-43.
19
See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law
Issues, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1240-49 (2014); L. Camille H6bert, ConceptualizingSexual
Harassmentin the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1341-44 (2014);
Laura Rothstein, Disability DiscriminationStatutes or Tort Law: Which Provides the Best
Means to Ensure an Accessible Environment?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1275-81 (2014).
20
See Corbett, supra note 11, at 1035-39.
21 See Corbett, supra note 11, at 1030, 1050, 1058.
22 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1078.
23
Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1090.
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Sperino's Let's PretendDiscriminationIs a Tort spells out how very different

the body of employment discrimination law might look if courts took the tort
analogy seriously. 24 Her observation that tort law is "both a set of substantive
choices and a methodology" opens up the possibility of infusing civil rights
statutes with a dynamic version of tort law that responds to changing
circumstances, including "new understandings about the way that
discrimination is perpetrated." 25 Finally, torts scholar W. Jonathan Cardi looks
beneath recent judicial rulings to discover an "embrace of tort concepts [that]
runs even deeper than [courts] have expressly stated." 2 6 The Role of
Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases asserts that

the all-important tort concept of "duty"-along with policy -considerations
commonly relied on to limit duties-may help explain the outcomes of
employment discrimination cases, with concern for employer freedom and atwill employment functioning as the equivalent of a "no-duty" rule.27
Standing back from the current incorporation debate, Maria L. Ontiveros
and Catherine E. Smith envision alternative models for Title VII liability that
would set the law on a more progressive course. 28 Rather than reach for tort
law for guidance, Ontiveros argues that courts should be mindful of the
powerful history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which "gave life to basic,
fundamental principles upon which our Constitution and overall systems of
laws are based and which the country demanded." 2 9 The FundamentalNature
of Title VII sets out a broader vision of Title VII by placing it in the context of
the other important titles of the 1964 legislation, treating it as a "superstatute," and considering the equal right of individuals to own and use their
labor as an aspect of human rights law. 30 By way of contrast, Smith believes
that "tort law is a logical and valuable" source of principles for courts in
employment discrimination cases. 3 1 In Looking to Torts: Exploring the Risks
of Workplace Discrimination, however, Smith argues for a new approach to

torts borrowing that would authorize courts to address and regulate implicit
bias as part of its torts-like function of "rooting out conduct in the workplace
that poses risks of discrimination." 32 Finally, with respect to disability and
genetic discrimination, Ifeoma Ajunwa and Laura Rothstein take a "both/and"
approach, arguing that vigorous enforcement of broadly-conceived tort and
anti-discrimination statutory protection is necessary to capture the wide range
of harms in these relatively new areas of civil rights. In Genetic Testing Meets
Big Data: Tort and ContractLaw Issues, Ajunwa addresses the harms, in the
24

See Sperino, supra note 14, at 1116-18.
supranote 14, at 1107.

25 Sperino,

26 Cardi, supranote 18, at 1128.
27 See Cardi,supra note 18, at 1129-32, 1138-40.
28
See Ontiveros, supra note 17, at 1202-03; Smith, supranote 16, at 1231.
29
Ontiveros, supra note 17, at 1164.
30
See Ontiveros, supra note 17, at 1172-74.
31 Smith, supra note 16, at 1206.
32
Smith, supra note 16,. at 1207.
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workplace and beyond, arising from inadvertent disclosure of genetic
information obtained by genetic testing. 33 In Disability Discrimination
Statutes or Tort Law: Which Provides the Best Means to Ensure an Accessible
Environment?,34 Rothstein discusses the complex legal landscape facing
wheelchair users and other individuals with mobility impairments when they
attempt to use law to make the physical environment more accessible.
The final three Symposium contributions tackle two discrete, fast-moving
areas of civil rights law: the law of harassment and retaliation law. In Two
Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law,
Martha Chamallas criticizes the Court's importation of common law tort and
agency principles to narrow the scope of employer vicarious liability in Title
VII harassment cases. 35 Reminding us of the infamous "fellow servant" rule
that virtually closed off tort recovery for employees injured on the job-and
the markedly different structural features of torts versus Title VII law-she
maintains that incorporation is "anomalous" because "[t]here is really little of
value to borrow here." 36 Gravitating towards tort law, in Conceptualizing
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary Tort, L. Camille H6bert
borrows from French, Canadian, and E.U. law to explore whether
discrimination victims might benefit from treating sexual harassment as a
"dignitary tort." 37 Mapping the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress onto fact patterns in hostile environment cases, she finds
potential in using a dignity tort frame to supplement, but not supplant, Title
VII's discrimination frame. 38 The Symposium concludes with a contribution
by Deborah L. Brake who excavates dozens of lower court cases to reveal
"how tort principles have quietly taken root in retaliation law[.]" 39 In
Tortifying Retaliation:ProtectedActivity at the Intersection ofFault,Duty and
Causation, Brake's assessment is that "tort analogies may have more staying
power in retaliation than the rest of employment discrimination[,]" as courts
increasingly rely on no-duty and proximate cause reasoning to limit the
threshold of what counts as protected activity and which employees are
protected from retaliatory measures. 4 0

33

See Ajunwa, supra note 19, at 1223-29.
34 See Rothstein, supra note 19, at 1265-73.
35
See Chamallas,supra note 15, at 1319-27.
36
Chamallas, supra note 15, at 1334.
37
See Hdbert, supra note 19, at 1345-47.
38
See Hdbert, supra note 19, at 1368-69.
39

40

Brake, supra note 16, at 1371.

Brake, supra note 16, at 1377.

